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NOTES
The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Assessment
by Mary Victoria White*
I. INTRODUCTION
The world in which we live is gradually becoming a close-knit com-
munity whose members increasingly depend on each other for economic
security, and are accountable to each other as custodians of the world's
environment.1 Furthermore, a growing consensus maintains that the more
advanced members of this community have a duty to help their develop-
ing neighbors make social and economic improvements. The spirit of this
emerging world economic order is embodied in a principle, the "common
heritage of mankind," which many see as a philosophical and legal tool
for equitable redistribution of the world's wealth, including resources still
untapped. This note assesses the potential utility of this principle for the
achievement of this goal in light of its stormy political history.
Two multilateral treaties have incorporated the common heritage
principle: the 1979 Moon Treaty2 and the evolving Law of the Sea
Treaty.3 This principle is conspicuously absent, however, from the 1959
Antarctic Treaty,4 which was supposed to embody similar goals. The
story of these treaties, which govern remote areas replete with vast min-
* Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 1983. The author
wishes to acknowledge that since the writing of this Note the United Nation Convention on
the Law of the Sea has been completed, and signed by 117 nations. The United States has
signed the Final Act, but not the Convention itself. United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122/Corr. 3 (Nov. 23, 1982) and A/CONF.62/Corr.8 (Nov.
26, 1982); reprinted at 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1261 (1982). A list of signatories to the
Final Act and to the Convention appears at 21 IN'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1477 (1982).
1 See Note, Thaw in International Law? Rights in Antarctica under the Law of Com-
mon Spaces, 87 YALE L.J. 804, 824 (1978).
2 Moon Treaty, see infra note 217.
3 Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, see infra note 238.
4 Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 795, T.I.A.S. No. 4780 [hereinafter
cited as Antarctic Treaty].
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eral deposits, 5 is the story of a political and economic world revolution
aimed at securing the benefits of these resources for everyone. Because
the successful distribution of wealth is inextricably linked with the princi-
ple's implementation, the development of thecommon heritage principle
in these agreements is a major topic of this note. The scope of the princi-
ple as international law will be analyzed in light of its history. Finally,
prospects for future application of the principle will be presented along
with an analysis of the numerous political problems which must be over-
come before the common heritage principle can be applied meaningfully
as a tool for global resource management.
II. HISTORY
A. Early History (Pre-2Oth Century)
Until quite recently mare liberum, freedom of the seas, was accepted
universally an an international legal principle.' In the 15th century, gun-
powder extended a coastal state's effective control of the sea only about
three miles offshore. This left the ocean open to all.7 It was not until the
' The deep seabed is known to contain massive deposits, on the scale of billions and
trillions of tons, of manganese, nickel, copper, cobalt, aluminum, titanium, iron, vanadium,
lead, cadmium, zirconium, gold and silver. See N. REMBE, AFRICA AND TiE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE SEA 43-44 (1980), and Auburn, The International Seabed Area, 20 INT'L. &
Compw. L.Q. 75-76 (1971). Antarctica's most promising resource is the krill inhabiting its wa-
ters; they are a good source of protein and are easy to harvest. Barnes, The Emerging
Antarctic Living Resources Convention, 73 AM. Soc. INT'L. L. PRoc. 272 (1979). Because of
the delicate nature of the ecosystem, however, overfishing is a major concern. Id. at 273.
Though mineral resources are known to occur on the mainland, lack of reliable data on their
quality and quantity, combined with the forbidding climate, make exploitation economically
impossible at present. See Burton, New Stresses on the Antarctic Treaty: Toward Interna-
tional Legal Institutions Governing Antarctic Resources, 65 VA. L. REv. 421, 433-434
(1979). The low grade of known coal deposits is discouraging in view of the enormous incen-
tives required, and the general non-acceptance of coal as a substitute for oil. Griffith, World
Coal Production, 240 ScIENrIc AMERICAN 38 (1979). Continental shelf deposits of oil and
gas present the best current prospects for mineral development, but the weather and the
size of Antarctic icebergs may make drilling impossible. See Dugger, Exploiting Antarctic
Mineral Resources: Technology, Economics, and the Environment, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv.
315, 319-321 (1978); see also Burton, supra, at 435-436. A 1975 NASA study shows that the
moon could be mined, using conventional techniques, for aluminum, silicon, iron, magne-
sium, and oxygen. While data are lacking on the effects of low gravity on workers, it appears
that 90% of the materials needed to build an orbiting power station are available from the
moon. Sadin, The Moon Treaty: Should the United States Become a Party?, 74 AM. Soc.
INT'L. L. PROC. 153 (1980).
6 A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 4 (1981).
' The famous treatise was written in 1609 by Grotius in response to limitations placed
by Spain and Portugal on freedom of navigation in the New World, and to the needs of
rising maritime powers. H. GROTnUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (1916). See also, A. HOL-
LICK, supra note 6, at 5.
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18th and 19th centuries that States began to establish limited territorial
waters, generally only three nautical miles wide, and merely for fishing
purposes.' The concept of limited enclosure of oceans was not actually
recognized until the 20th century.9
Early claims to Antarctica followed the general doctrine of discovery
and occupation. 10 Spain, Britain, France, Germany, Norway, Belgium, the
United States, and what is now the U.S.S.R. all sent explorers to Antarc-
tica between the 16th and 19th centuries.' Although some expeditions
were more substantial than others, they all generally conveyed a sense of
control over this region by the sponsoring nation,12 in direct contrast to
the mare liberum principle.
B. Early Modern History (1900 - 1960)
Between 1900 and 1940 nine countries actively explored Antarctica.
Britain declared island possessions and set up governments; 3 Chile, Ar-
gentina, Norway, Australia, France, Denmark, and New Zealand also as-
serted claims.' 4 The United States sponsored two expeditions led by Ad-
miral Richard Byrd and established base camps and weather stations on
the Ross Ice Shelf.15 Further, three cases decided by international tribu-
nals between 1928 and 1932, holding that only "effective occupation" 6
was needed to sustain a claim of sovereignty, 7 gave many states incentive
to assert such claims.
In 1930, a conference at The Hague addressed coastal States' needs
8 Id.
9 Id. See also S. CASEY, PRECEPT FOR BENTmIc EXPLORATION AND EXPLorrATION (1968).
10 Oxman, The Antarctic Regime: An Introduction, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285, 288
(1978). A few claims were based on "contiguity" (extension southward of the outermost lines
of longitude touching the claimant State to form a "sector"). For an excellent discussion of
early efforts at discovery and occupation, see Pinto, The International Community and
Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. Rlv. 475, 476 (1978).
n Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island Dependencies, 25 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 311, 319-320 (1948).
12 See generally Waldock, supra note 11, and Pinto, supra note 10.
,1 Waldock, supra note 11, at 327-28.
14 Id. at 333 and 338-39.
15 The expeditions took place in 1928 and 1940. Id. at 333-334. For an excellent account
of Admiral Byrd's winter alone in a U.S. weather station on the Ross Ice Shelf in 1934, see
R. BYRD, ALoNE (1938).
"6 Islands of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 831 (1928);
reprinted in Judicial Decisions, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 867 (1928); Eastern Greenland, 1931
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53; and Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1105 (1931). See Waldock, supra note 13, at 315.
17 According to Waldock, these three cases established that the test of effective occupa-
tion was whether the claimant had engaged in "effective activity... either internally or
externally in relations with other states." This, not actual settlement, was now the "founda-
tion of a title by occupation." Id. at 317.
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for law governing the territorial sea. Though the members failed to settle
on a width for territorial waters,"' they agreed that coastal States had
sovereignty over their territorial seas. 9 This concept of sovereignty was
extended to the continental shelf in 1945 when President Truman pro-
claimed that "the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the con-
tinental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the
United States. . . appertain to the United States" and are "subject to its
jurisdiction and control.' 20 Numerous other coastal nations followed
suit.21
At roughly the same time, Argentina and Chile claimed the Falkland
Island Dependencies in Antarctica, where the British had already set up a
government. 2 In response to this and other disputes, the United States
refused to recognize any claims to Antarctica, advancing a proposal in
1948 which would have vested control of the continent in the interested
States, or in the alternative, set up a multiple condominium over the in-
ternationalized area.2 These alternatives called for demilitarization and
freedom of exploration. 24
While this proposal was under discussion, the United Nations Inter-
national Law Commission was preparing to deal with continental shelf,
territorial sea and high sea issues.'5 In 1957, this Commission formulated
an "exploitability rule", whereby jurisdiction could be extended as far as
a state could feasibly exploit the resources of the shelf, with no prescribed
limits.'6
'a S. CASEY, supra note 9, at 12.
19 A. HOLLICK, supra note 6, at 5-6.
20 "The Truman Proclamations", Proclamation 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945); re-
printed in A. HOLLICK, supra note 6, at Appendix 1, 391-393. The stated bases for the claim
were contiguity of land mass and shelf, geological unity of minerals in both areas, need for
the resources, availability of mining technology, and need to safeguard the continental shelf
from exploitation by other States.
21 E.g., Mexico, 1945; Argentina, 1946; Chile, 1947; Peru, 1947; Costa Rica, 1949; and
Korea, 1952. See G. WEISSBERG, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE
JAPANESE-KOREAN FISHING DispuTE, Appendices A, E-I (1966). Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica
also claimed "epicontinental" seas of 200 nautical miles. Id., Appendices F, I, and G. Ca-
nada, Newfoundland, and the United Kingdom reacted negatively to these Proclamations,
and the rest of the world was "officially noncommittal". A. HOLLICK, supra note 6, at 60-61.
'2 Waldock, supra note 11, at 11.
2 Hannessian, The Antarctic Treaty, 1959, 9 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 436-438 (1960).
24 Id. at 438-439.
25 U.S. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 2D
SEss., THE THIRD U.N. LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 5 (Comm. Print 1978). (Prepared by
H.T. Franssen at the request of Hon. Howard W. Cannon, Chairman, Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, and Warren G. Magnuson, Chairperson, National
Ocean Policy Study) [hereinafter cited as THIRD SEA CONFERENCE].
28 G.A. Res. 1105, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17A) at 54, U.N. Doc. A/3572(11). See
also THIRD SEA CONFERENCE, supra note 25, at 5. See also S. Casey, supra note 9, at 22-23.
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The controversy between Argentina, Britain, and Chile over
Antarctic sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies came to a
head in the 1956 Antarctica Cases.2 7 With the commencement of the In-
ternational Geophysical Year,2 Argentina and Chile renewed their claims,
fearing that the spirit of cooperation might blossom into a movement for
internationalization of the continent.29 Thus, when the United States pro-
posed an international organization for the peaceful use of Antarctica,
Chile vehemently denounced the proposed infringement on its "rights." 30
In the midst of this deadlock, delegates from 86 nations gathered in
Geneva for the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS I).31 Despite obvious East-West political hostilities,32 the
members produced four conventions including the Convention on the
Continental Shelf.3 3 This Convention extended coastal State jurisdiction
over the adjacent seabed to a depth of 200 meters or more if exploitation
was still possible, but only for the purpose of resource recovery.3 4 Shortly
The Commission also concluded that coastal nations had sovereign rights to their continen-
tal shelves for resource exploitation; that the shelf extended out to a depth of 200 meters;
and that contiguity justified jurisdiction of a State over its continental shelf.
27 Antarctica Cases (Gr. Brit. v. Argentina and Chile), 1956 I.C.J. Pleadings. In its ap-
plication, Britain alleged that Argentina and Chile were infringing on British claims which
were based on acts of British nationals between 1675 and 1853 and on continuous displays
of sovereignty thereafter. The Falkland Islands are located about 300 miles east of Argen-
tina and Chile, in the South Atlantic. The Falkland Islands Dependencies include the South
Orkney, South Shetland, and South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia Island, Alexander
Land, and portions of the Antarctic continent called Graham Land and Coats Land; 1956
I.C.J. Pleadings, at 450-451.
2'8 Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration, 68 Am. J.
INT'L L. 217, 218-19 (1974). The participating States set up observation bases, exchanged
observers, and assisted each other in emergencies.
2 Hannessian, supra note 23, at 454-55. On February 18, 1958, Chile's Foreign Minister
stated that his government "could only reject any proposal which might imply the interna-
tionalization of, or condominium over, any part of (Chile's) national territory, whether it be
in the Antarctic, in America, or its insular possessions in the South Pacific." Id., citing
Chile, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Admin. Bureau, Foreign Information and Cultural Rela-
tions Branch Circular No. 21, Santiago, Feb. 18, 1958.
30 Hannessian, supra note 23, at 455-57.
31 A. HOLLICK, supra note 6, at 127.
2 African and Asian States were suspicious of the maritime policies of their former
colonizers. Id. at 135.
23 Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention]. For discussions
of the other conventions adopted at the Conference, see THIRD SEA CONFERENCE, supra note
25, at 6-7, and A. HOLLICK, supra note 6, at 140-150.
31 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 33, at Articles 1-2. Pardo points out the
ambiguity inherent in this language: "Under this concept a coastal state, as its technical
capability develops, may extend its jurisdiction across the ocean floor up to the midway
point between it and the coastal state opposite." As a result, "all the submerged lands of the
world may become parts of the continental shelf by the very definition of the Convention."
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after UNCLOS I the United States organized a conference on the peace-
ful uses of Antarctica. The group met 60 times between June 1958 and
October 1959. Throughout this period Chile and Argentina remained ada-
mant about their claims.3 5
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty Conference began in earnest after 16
months of preliminary meetings."6 Although Argentina and Chile contin-
ued to denounce internationalization, negotiations proceeded nonethe-
less,37 and the Antarctic Treaty came into being on December 1, 1959.38 It
declared that Antarctica could be used only for peaceful purposes and
provided for freedom of scientific investigation and access to all installa-
tions." Significantly, the Treaty froze all existing claims, disallowed new
ones, and forbade the assertion of sovereignty by virtue of activities tak-
ing place while the Treaty was in force.40 References to natural resources
were purposely excluded.4 1
At the close of the International Geophysical Year the U.N. noted
the success of several fledgling satellite programs, affirming both "the
common interest of mankind in outer space" and "the common aim that
outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only. '42 Consequently, it
formed the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) and instructed it to report on possible international programs
and their legal implications.4 s
C. The U.N. Development Decade (1960 - 1970)
During the next ten years, which the U.N. adopted as its "Develop-
ment Decade," political conflicts, heretofore East-West, reoriented them-
selves to a North-South struggle between the Third World and the indus-
trial States.
Pardo, Whose Is The Bed Of The Sea?, 62 AM. Soc. INT'L. L. PROC. 216 (1968).
35 38 DEPT. ST. BULL. 910-912 (June 1958). See Hannessian, supra note 23, at 462-63.
The invitation was issued to Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zea-
land, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom. All ac-
cepted. Id. at 457.
38 Hannessian, supra note 23, at 463-64.
"' The Parties, which had to meet the requirement of "substantial activity", were Ar-
gentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the
U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States. Introduction, Development of Ant-
arctica, 73 AM. Soc. INTL'. L. PROC. 265 (1979).
3 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4.39 Id. at Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 3, 7 and 12.
40 Id. at Article 4.
" Id. See Hambro, supra note 28, at 221.
42 G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
43 Id. The members were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslova-
kia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the U.S.S.R., the United
Kingdom, the United Arab Republic, and the United States.
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COPUOS was active.44 The Committee resolved that outer space and
the celestial bodies were free for use by all countries, but only in accor-
dance with international law.45 Building on the "common interest" con-
cept, COPUOS further declared that "the exploration and use of outer
space should be only for the betterment of mankind" (emphasis added).46
Another significant achievement was legal personality for private entities:
the United States introduced a resolution extending the provision permit-
ting States to conduct activities on the moon to private companies acting
under the authority of their governments.47
The culmination of the Committee's work was a "Declaration of Le-
gal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, '48 which stressed the "common interest of all man-
kind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes.' ' 9 The nine principles included: activities "for the benefit of
and in the interests of all mankind" 50 with equal access for all States;51 no
sovereignty;52 compliance with international law;53 and special interna-
tional status for astronauts as "envoys of mankind."" These principles
guided all subsequent discussions of outer space resources.
The Development Decade also saw significant progress in the formu-
lation of multilateral agreements. UNCLOS IE began55 where UNCLOS I
left off with the problem of designating a width of territorial seas.56 Over-
riding the objections of Britain, Japan and the United States, the Confer-
ence members declared a 12-mile contiguous zone, but pronounced no
limits on shelf jurisdiction. 57 However, during the next six years African,
Asian, and Latin American countries continued to claim territorial seas,
" N. REMBE, supra note 5, at 37.
" G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). The
Resolution also provided that neither outer space nor celestial bodies were subject to
appropriation.
41Supra note 45, at Preamble. Note also that "mankind as a whole" now reads
"mankind".
7 See Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L. LAW.
429, 436 (1980).
48 G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 15, U.N. Doc. A.5515 (1963).
4 Id. at Preamble.
50 Id. at Article 1.
51 Id. at Article 2.
52 Id. at Article 3.
83 Id. at Article 4.
5Id. at Article 9.
51 Convened by G.A. Res. 1307, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 54, U.N. Doc. A/4090
(1958). The Conference lasted from March 17 through April 27, 1960. Eighty-eight nations
participated. Tinm SEA CONFERENCE, supra note 25, at 8.
"A. HOLLICK, supra note 6, at 157-59.
57See Pardo, supra note 34; A. HoLLICK, supra note 6, at 157-59.
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some being 200 miles wide."8 Meanwhile, the growth of undersea technol-
ogy prompted the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD)59 to study the use of deep seabed food and mineral resources
for international development.60
Members of UNCLOS also felt the need to articulate guidelines for
use of the seabed. In July 1966, President Lyndon Johnson warned that
the seabed, "the legacy of all human beings," ' should be protected from
unfettered harvesting.62 With this aim in mind, Malta's Ambassador Ar-
vid Pardo announced on September 21, 1967, that the seabed and the
ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction were the "common
heritage of mankind."' s Pardo explained his purpose in introducing this
novel concept as being:
to provide a solid basis for future worldwide cooperation ... through the
acceptance by the international community of a new principle of interna-
tional law, .. . that the seabed and ocean floor and their subsoil have a
special status as a common heritage of mankind and as such should be
reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and administered by an in-
ternational authority for the benefit of all peoples ... (emphasis
added)."
Pardo believed that world peace depended on the principle's extension to
other areas as well.6 5 The common heritage principle became the corner-
stone of the contemporary law of the sea and a powerful source of inspira-
tion for the increasingly vocal Group of 77, an alliance of developing
countries."6
Fearing that the new concept was a political Pandora's Box, the U.N.
decided to refer it to the First Committee (political matters), rather than
to the Second Committee (economics), where it normally would have
" A. HOLLIcK, supra note 6, at 162.
" The UNCTAD program was formed in 1964 in response to the growing North-South
political split, for the purpose of achieving massive transfers of technology to the underde-
veloped States. Id. at 170-171.
" On December 6, 1966, the U.N. endorsed G.A. Res. 2172, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 32, U.N. Doc. A/653 (1966), requesting a survey of mineral and food resources existing
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 1 T. KRONmanuE, Tim LAwFuLNEss OF DEEP SEA-
BED MINING 20 (1978).
" N. RFmBE, supra note 5, at 38.
02 President Johnson felt that unlimited unilateral use of seabed resources would only
perpetuate the colonialism from which the developing countries were trying to emerge. Id.
" G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
" Pardo, supra note 34, at 225-226.
Id.
N. REMBE, supra note 5, at 49-50, 56-57. Rembe notes that the common heritage
prirciple is completely reconcilable with African traditions of common ownership and man-
agement. Id. at 53.
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been sent.6 7 The First Committee established a Seabed Committee s to
study and report on the exploration, conservation and peaceful use of the
deep seabed. 9 The Seabed Committee was made a standing committee in
a 1968 resolution affirming the idea of exploitation of the seabed "for the
benefit of mankind as a whole, taking into account the special interests
and needs of the developing countries. '70 The Committee was directed to
formulate a regime for seabed resource exploitation.71 The developed
countries, which were disenchanted with the idea of an international re-
gime 7 2 reacted unfavorably to this resolution and to its companion, Reso-
lution 2754, which placed a moratorium on seabed mining pending estab-
lishment of the regime.7 3
Aware that the next Conference would probably assume the task of
reviewing the entire law of the sea,74 the Seabed Committee organized
and met several times in 1969.75 These meetings accomplished little ex-
cept to articulate the two sides of the seabed resources dispute. The
Group of 77 believed an international exploitation regime was mandated
by the common heritage principle,7 while the developed countries would
only accept a limited registry system with States controlling their own
operations. 77
Three weeks after the Pardo Declaration, the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty came into force.78 Though it did not-mention the new common
heritage principle, it stated that exploration would be "the province of all
mankind" and would be carried out "for the benefit and in the interest of
67 1 T. KRONMMLER, supra note 60, at 23 (1978). The author asserts that this decision
paved the way to subsequent ideological disputes.
Supra note 63.
e' Id. See A. HoLLK, supra note 6, at 201.
0' G.A. Res. 2467, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 15-16, U.N. Doe. A/7218 (1968).
71 Id.
72 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 60, at 26.
73 G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
They argued that the principle of freedom of the seas should apply in the interim. 1 T.
KRONMILLER, supra note 60, at 32. The less developed States felt that because a moratorium
was necessary to preserve the "Common Heritage", the principle embodied a legal obliga-
tion not to mine the seabed. The developed States argued that this view was incompatible
with the non-binding nature of U.N. resolutions. Id. at 31-32.
74 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 60, at 41.
71 A. HOLLICK, supra note 6, at 220.
76 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of Natonal Jurisdiction, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22) at 97, U.N. Doc.
A/7622 (1969). See Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind". A Political,
Moral or Legal Innovation?, 9 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 390, 395 (1972).
77 61 Dm'-r. ST. BULL. 288 (Sept. 1969). See A. HoLacK, supra note 6, at 215-216, 222.
70, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, April 25, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
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all countries. 7 In a provision borrowed from the Antarctic Treaty,80
claims of sovereignty in outer space were outlawed."' The Treaty followed
the guidelines of the Declaration of Principles,8 2 including demilitariza-
tion.83 Private entities were permitted to operate in outer space under the
supervision of their home States.8
American astronauts Armstrong and Aldrin walked on the moon in
July 1969.85 The arrival of moonrocks triggered a heightened awareness of
the resource potential of outer space,88 and attitudes similar to those ex-
pressed concerning seabed resources prompted Argentina and Poland to
request that COPUOS consider possible international machinery for the
exploitation of extraterrestrial resources. 87
D. Defining the "Common Heritage" (1970 - 1979)
1. 1970-1971-Attempts at Implementation
Initially the United States was willing to apply the common heritage
principle to the deep seabed. In May 1970, the President proposed that
all resources located beyond a depth of 200 meters be regarded as the
common heritage of mankind, with the area extending to the edge of the
continental margin held in trust by each adjacent coastal State.88 Reve-
nues from the trusteeship area would be apportioned between the trustee
State and an international seabed resource authority, which would utilize
its portion for "mankind", particularly in the developing countries.8
The day after this proposal was submitted, a delegation of Latin
American States met in Lima to discuss certain issues of the law of the
sea. One of the results of this meeting was the "Declaration of the Latin
American States on the Law of the Sea,"90 and an accompanying resolu-
71 Id. at Article 1.
80 Christol, supra note 47, at 436.
81 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 78, at Article 2.
" Supra note 48.
" Other principles recognized in the Treaty included absence of sovereignty, peaceful
use, mutual assistance, sharing of information, liability for damages, and special interna-
tional status for astronauts. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 78, at Articles 2-11.
" Id. at Article 6. See Christol, supra note 47, at 438.
" D. BIRNEY, MODERN ASTRONOMY 141 (1974).
" See Christol, supra note 47, at 431.
'8 U.N. Doc. AIAC.105/58, Annex 1, at 6-7, July 4, 1969; U.N. Doc. AIAC.105/C.2L.66.
See Christol, An International Regime, Including Appropriate Procedures, for the Moon:
Article 11, Paragraph 5 of the 1979 Moon Treaty, PROC. OF 23RD COLLOQ. ON LAw OF OUTER
SPACE 139, 140 (1980).
" 1 T. KRONMLLER, supra note 60, at 33; A. HOLLICK, supra note 6, at 231.
89 Auburn, supra note 5, at 178.
'o U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/28 (1970); reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATnIALs 207 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Lima Declaration].
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tion on the deep seabed.91 The Declaration asserted the right of a coastal
nation both to exploit the resources of the adjacent water and subsoil and
to determine the extent of its sovereignty over them.92 The Resolution
declared that the resources of the deep seabed "should be the common
heritage of mankind" and advocated an international regime to assure
that all mankind, especially the developing countries, would reap the
benefits.
9 3
An even stronger statement emerged from the Third Conference of
Non-Aligned Countries. Sixty-five African, Asian, and Latin American
States and six national liberation organizations resolved that the devel-
oped world could no longer prosper at the expense of the developing
countries." The Conference members endorsed application of the com-
mon heritage principle to the resources of the deep seabed, supported the
idea of an international resource regime, and urged that adverse effects
on existing mineral markets in the Third World be minimized.95 The con-
victions expressed at Lusaka and Lima characterized the stance of the
Group of 77 at the upcoming UNCLOS III, a stance from which they
would be unwilling to retreat.98
At the same time, the Antarctic Consultative Parties had become
concerned about danger to the Antarctic environment arising from
human activity. As a result, they recommended that their scientific com-
mittee study the environmental impacts of human exploration in Antarc-
"' Id. at Annex; reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATER LS 208 [hereinafter cited as Reso-
lution 1].
g2 Lima Declaration, supra note 90, at Articles 1, 2. The States were to make this deter-
mination "in accordance with reasonable criteria."
' Resolution 1, supra note 91, at Preamble.
', Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Indepen-
dence, Co-Operation and Democratisation of International Relations, U.N. Note Verbale
NV/209 of November 12, 1970; reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATrmuA s 215 [hereinafter
cited as Lusaka Declaration]. The Parties declared that the technological revolution must
no longer be the "monopoly of the rich ... it is intolerable ... for some to enjoy an un-
troubled and comfortable existence in exchange for the poverty and misfortune of others."
The Declaration also expounded on the rights of the developing countries to active partici-
pation in international affairs, and to a stronger role in the U.N. Not surprisingly, the Dec-
laration endorsed actions initiated on behalf of "mankind". Id. at Article 9.
95 NAC/CONF.3/RES.11 (1970), reprinted in 10 INT'L .LEGAL MATERIALS 219 (1970).
The statement also provided that the resources were not subject to claims of sovereignty
(par. 2), should only be used for peaceful purposes (par. 3), and should be used "for the
benefit of mankind as a whole" (par. 4). Id. at Article 1, par. (1),(5).
" The African States' approach as reflected in the Lusaka Declaration has been influ-
enced by their desire for rapid development and economic independence, for sovereignty
over their own natural resources, and for a general reform of international law, by their
general suspicion of "customary" legal concepts legitimizing colonialism; and by their efforts
to nationalize their economies, particularly in relation to their resources. N. REmBE, supra
note 5, at 3-27.
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tica.97 While this study was underway, the Seabed Committee was shap-
ing principles to guide formation of policy on the deep seabed. These
principles were embodied in Resolution 2749, which held the seabed and
its resources to be the common heritage of mankind.98 All exploration and
exploitation would be governed by an international regime99 and would be
"carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole.., taking into partic-
ular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries."'00
The regime itself would ensure "orderly and safe development and ra-
tional management of the area and its resources... and... equitable
sharing by States in the benefits therefrom."' 01 The Resolution echoed
many of the ideas expressed in the 1963 Declaration of Principles regard-
ing outer space,' 02 but differed in three important respects: it emphasized
the special needs of the developing countries,10' provided for an interna-
tional resource regime,' 0 ' and embraced the common heritage principle.1
However, it left unresolved three crucial issues: the limits of national ju-
risdiction of the ocean floor, the nature of the regime, and methods by
which the developing countries were to be specially accommodated.'
A companion resolution'0 7 addressed the concern of the Group of 77
about the impact of seabed mining on land mineral markets. 08 This reso-
lution prompted a series of studies revealing potential damage to the
economies of several mineral producers. 09 It was evident that careful
management would be needed to keep the theory of common heritage
from undermining the very development it was intended to promote."0
Argentina submitted the first concrete proposal for a lunar resource
91 Recommendations of the Sixth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Oct. 30, 1970,
Recommendation VI-4(1974), 25 U.S.T. 266, T.I.A.S. No. 7796 (1970).
98 G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970).
" Id. at Articles 3 and 4.
100 Id. at Article 7.
:01 G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 98, at Article 9.
1 See supra notes 45, 80.
101 G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 98, at Articles 7, 9, and 10.
I" Id. at Articles 4, 9, and 11.
108 Id. at Article 1.
'06 Alexander, Future Regimes: A Survey of Proposals, in 3 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA 119 (R. Churchill ed. 1973).
'07G.A. Res. 2750A, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970).
108 See Lusaka Declaration, supra note 94.
109 N. REmBE, supra note 5, at 71. The studies revealed that:
"1) By 1985 seabed cobalt may be as high as half of the level of world output, and
this may depress prices by two thirds of their current levels.
2) Manganese could meet 73% of the import requirements of the developed coun-
tries, and this would depress prices by half...
3) Nickel is the mainstay of the seabed mining industry; its production would
total 18% of world demand by 1985, and this may depress prices ......1o0 Id. at 71-72.
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regime to the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee in 1970. This proposal pro-
vided that "the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies
shall be the common heritage of all mankind."'11 It defined "resources" as
"all substances originating in the Moon and other celestial bodies.,
2
Benefits accruing from the resources "would be made available to all peo-
ples without discrimination of any kind."11' 3 No action was taken on this
draft.1 4 A Russian proposal in 1971 took the opposite approach, omitting
any reference to the common heritage of mankind or resource regimes"2
5
and stressing peaceful use of the moon in view of its importance in the
"conquest of outer space."" 6
Three seabed proposals in 1971 gave life to the common heritage
principle without reaching any consensus. A British proposal advocated
guaranteed access to the seabed for all States, with such access regulated
by an International Seabed Authority exercising loose control. Each State
would receive an equitable share of the proceeds." 7 Tanzania espoused a
centralized regime without guaranteed access, the Authority having broad
powers and exercising strict control over all seabed activities."" Finally,
the "Thirteen Power Proposal" set up "mankind" as a seabed manager
with the authority to mine the seabed on "mankind's" behalf."9 There
was, however, no consensus on the nature of the seabed regime, if indeed
there would be any.'O
" U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/85, Annex H, p. 1-2 at Article I; reprinted in Current Docu-
ments, 9 J. SPACE L. 128 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Argentina Proposal]. See Christol,
supra note 87, at 140.
112 Argentina Proposal, supra note 111, at Article 2.
"' Id. at Article 4.
114 Bond, The Moon Treaty: Should the United States Become a Party?, 74 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. PROC. 157 (1980).
"5 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Proposed Treaty Request to the U.N. General
Assembly, June 4, 1971, U.N. Doc. A/8391; reprinted in Current Documents, 9 J. SPACE L.
129 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Russian Draft Treaty]. See also Bond, supra note 114, at
157.
Christol comments on the absence of a regime proposal: "This absence was consistent
with the failure of the Soviet proposal to follow the Argentinian lead respecting the distri-
bution of benefits to be derived from the exploitation of Moon Resources. Undoubtedly the
decision (not) to advance a plan for an international organization to implement either or
both of the proposed ... regimes was intentional." Christol, supra note 87, at 141.
16 Russian Draft Treaty, supra note 115, at Article 2.
11 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Be-
yond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20), U.N. Doc. A/8420
and Annex I (1971); reprinted in 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 60, at 45-46.
1"8 Report of the Committee, supra note 117, at 19 and Annex I. See 1 T. KRONMILLER,
supra note 60, at 47-48.
"' Report of the Committee, supra note 117, at 21 and Annex I. See 1 T. KRONMILLER,
supra note 60, at 48-49.
"2 Id. at 49.
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2. 1972-1974-Developing States Take a Stand
The spring of 1972 was a time of progress in outer space law. The
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects1 2' recognized the need for international legislation governing inevita-
ble accidents involving objects launched into space.'22 In this progressive
spirit, '2 the United States submitted a proposal to the Legal Subcommit-
tee"' providing for freedom of scientific research,125 freedom from inter-
ference on the lunar surface,' 26 and State control of its own personnel and
equipment.127 The Draft defined "celestial body" as the moon and other
extraterrestrial bodies and their orbits 2 s and declared that "the natural
resources of the moon and other celestial bodies shall be the common
heritage of mankind (emphasis added).' 29 Significantly, the Draft pro-
posed to allow States Parties to appropriate and use the resources to sup-
port their outer space activities. 13 0 Furthermore, it was the natural re-
sources, and not the extraterrestrial 6bjects from which they came, which
would be given common heritage status at some time in the future.13
The Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon, completed in May 1972,132
was a major accomplishment in outer space law. While it acknowledged
that the moon played a critical role in the exploration, rather than the
"conquest,""'1 3 of outer space," 4 it did not specifically apply the common
heritage principle. 1 5 Instead, it stated that exploitation of the moon
would be "the province of all mankind" and would be "carried out for the
benefit of and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree
111 G.A. Res. 2777, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8528, Annex
(1971).
122 Id. at Preamble. The Convention imposed strict liability for damage caused either
on earth or to an aircraft in flight (Article 2) and liability based on fault for damage caused
elsewhere (Article 3).
'23 Bond, supra note 114, at 157-158. The United States felt that the Russian Draft
Treaty represented a step backward, and submitted its proposal in response to what it per-
ceived as a need for more forwardlooking legal machinery.
124 United States: Draft Proposals Submitted to Legal Subcommittee, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.101, Annex I (1972) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Draft Moon Proposal].
125 Id. at Article 3.
216 Id. at Article 5.
127 Id. at Article 9.
128 Id. at Article 4.
120 Id. at Article 8.
1"0 Id. at Article 8, par. 2.
1"' Cf. G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 98. There, the relevant provision declared that the
common heritage principle applied to both the seabed and its resources. See also Christol,
supra note 47, at 457.
12 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/101 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Draft Moon Treaty].
33 See Russian Draft Treaty, supra note 115, at Preamble.
134 Draft Moon Treaty, supra note 132, at Preamble.
1"8 Argentina Proposal, supra note 111, at Article 1.
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of economic or scientific development."' 3 6 The Draft followed the general
spirit of the Declaration of Principles and the earlier drafts.1 37
Antarctic negotiations saw developments of similar significance in
1972. At the Seventh Consultative Meeting the Parties addressed the
long-tabled issue of mineral resources." 8 Growing discomfort over the ec-
onomic' 39 and environmental implications of human activity in Antarctica
prompted a recommendation "reaffirming that it is in the interest of all
mankind that the Antarctic Treaty area be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes." The Parties urged a study of the effects of such activity." 0
The United States attempted to amend the Draft Moon Treaty in
1973 to provide for an international resource exploitation regime at the
time when exploitation became feasible. 4 ' The amendment also provided
that the resources, once extracted, would become the property of the
State that removed them."" Although this was not immediately accept-
able to the Subcommittee,"4 3 these additions were instrumental in shap-
ing the next Draft, and in effecting the compromise that finally made the
Moon Treaty a reality.
The long-awaited organizational session of UNCLOS II14' convened
in the wake of a powerful policy statement by the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) in July of 1973. The OAU Declaration on the Issues of the
Law of the Sea advocated an International Seabed Authority with "strong
and comprehensive powers" including jurisdiction over the entire deep
seabed area."14
Before commencement of the first substantive session of UNCLOS
III, the developing countries asserted themselves twice more. The
Kampala Declaration" ' demanded that UNCLOS consider the needs of
110 Id. at Article 4.
137 Cf. G.A. Res. 1962, supra note 48; Argentina Proposal, supra note 111; Russian
Draft Treaty, supra note 115; and U.S. Draft Moon Proposal, supra note 124.
's Dugger, supra note 5, at 316.
,' Hambro, supra note 28, at 221-222.
140 Recommendation VII-6, 7th Antarctic Consultative Meeting; reprinted in Hambro,
supra note 28, at 222.
141 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/115, Annex 1 (1973) at 32-34; reprinted in Current Documents,
9 J. SPACE L. 145-147 (1981).
142 Id. See Bond, supra note 114, at 159.
241 The Subcommittee accepted six minor textual revisions. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/115
(1973) at 5-7; reprinted in Current Documents, 9 J. SPACE L. 147-148 (1981).
144 The First Session, an organizational meeting, took place in New York on December
3-15, 1973. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974
Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975).
140 Declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the Issues of the Law of the
Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/63, OAU Doc. CM/RES.289 (XIX) (1973) [hereinafter cited as
OAU Declaration], at Article 22(a).
1,0 The Conference was held in Uganda, a land-locked State. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/64
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Kampala Declaration].
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landlocked and geographcally disadvantaged States. 47 In May 1974, the
U.N. adopted a Declaration on Establishment of a New International Ec-
onomic Order (NIEO) which sought to close the gap between industrial
and developing countries through interdependence and cooperation.
148
The U.N. also undertook to give the developing countries an increased
role in international decision-making and better access to modern tech-
nology. 149 As the new basis for world economic relations, the NIEO Decla-
ration and its principles pervaded the emerging Law of the Sea and be-
came an integral part of a global economic revolution.
5 0
Not surprisingly, the Second Session of UNCLOS III ran afoul of this
political upheaval.151 Charged with formulating a seabed mining regime,
the First Committee was able to do no more than clarify the divergent
views of the various "special interest" blocs.'52 The developing countries
generally favored a strong Authority with wide jurisdiction and sweeping
management powers. 5 3 On the other hand, the developed countries envi-
sioned, at most, a licensing and registry agency with minimal control over
States' activities in the seabed area.15 4 This stance disturbed the Group of
77, whose mining operations were largely controlled by large industrial
corporations. 55 These positions were, for the moment, irreconcilable.
In contrast, the atmosphere at the outer space resource negotiations
was more cooperative. The U.S.S.R. surprisingly endorsed a natural re-
147 Id. at Article 4.
G.A. Res. 0201, U.N. GAOR, Sixth Special Session, Supp. (No.1), U.N. Doc. A/9551
(1974); reprinted in Official Documents, 68 AM. J. INTL L. 798 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
NIEO]. The new order was to be based on "equity, sovereign equality, interdependence,
common interest, and cooperation among all states, irrespective of their economic and social
systems." Id. at Preamble.
1'l G.A. Res. 3201, supra note 148, at Article 6.
110 Rembe suggests that the new Law of the Sea has in fact been approached as part of
the New International Economic Order. N. REMBE, supra note 5, at 45. For a discussion of
the deep seabed mining issue in the context of NIEO, see Juda, Deep Seabed Mining and
the New International Economic Order, in COLLECTED PAPERS FROM CURRENT ISSUES IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA (Joyner ed. 1979).
Schroeder, The Law and the Sea: An Introductory Comment, 8 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 5, 27 (1976).
152 These groups, which played a lively role in the negotiating sessions, included the
"Group of 77" (the developing countries, now numbering over 120), the European Economic
Community, the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, and the coastal
States. Stevenson and Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea:
The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1975).
153 N. REMBE, supra note 5, at 60. The African States felt that a Seabed Authority
exercising exclusive jurisdiction throughout the Area would best serve the interests of the
developing countries.
15 Id. at 60-61.
155 Id. These countries are particularly sensitive regarding control over resources
originating in their territories. See NIEO, supra note 148, at Article 6(e).
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source regime based on "common use by all states,"1 5 and space law ad-
vanced a step.157
3. 1975-1978: Resource Regimes Take Shape
In preparation for the Third Session of UNCLOS III, First Commit-
tee Chairman Paul Engo coalesced the many ideas that were exchanged
at the brief Second Session 1 58 in an Informal Single Negotiating Text
(SNT). 159 This text formed the basis for negotiations at both the Third
and Fourth Sessions.16 0 The Parties were more cooperative than at the
prior session, although no treaties or drafts were adopted.'
Ideas on a lunar regime began converging in 1975. The U.S.S.R., the
German Democratic Republic and Poland agreed on the need for interna-
tional legal machinery at some future time.'62 A number of other States
felt that such a regime was necessary to ensure equitable distribution of
the benefits resulting from exploration, but were not yet prepared to con-
sider an international Authority such as the one under negotiation at UN-
CLOS 111.116
Rising OPEC prices prompted the Antarctic Consultative Parties to
focus on mineral resources at their 1975 session.6 They agreed to report
the following year on possible mineral recovery in Antarctica,16 5 and to
exercise restraint in their current operations in the meantime. 6 6 The in-
168 Christol, supra note 87, citing U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. (1974) at 8.
157 Id. at Preamble.
158 Chairman Engo's text consists of "ideas drawn from my personal impression of what
could provide a consensus, bearing in mind the nature and historic significance of the Con-
ference in general and the First Committee in particular. I was compelled in some instances
to look outside and beyond the unproductive debates that had dominated (the second) ses-
sion, especially considering the climate of distrust and acrimony between opposing sides."
United Nations, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Fifth Session, New York, 2 Au-
gust-17 Sept. 1976, A/CONF.62/L.16, 12 Sept. 1976, Report by Mr. Paul Bamela Engo,
Chairman of the First Committee, on the work of the Committee at the Fifth Session of the
Conference; reprinted in 6 NEW DmECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 681 (1977).
16 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Parts I, II, & III (6 & 7 May 1975); SD.Gp./2d. Ses-
sion/No.1/Rev.5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SNT]; reprinted in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA 582 (1977).
160 See, Note by the President of the Conference, Revised Single Negotiating Text, Doc.
A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1 (1976); reprinted in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 582
(1977).
161 Schroeder, supra note 151, at 34.
162 See Christol, supra note 87, at 144.
163 The States were India, Chile, Romania, Pakistan, and Japan. They focused on the
regime rather than the formation of an international organization involving the use of ap-
propriate procedures. Id. at 145.
16 Dugger, supra note 5, at 316.
265 Id.
'" While the Consultative Parties failed to agree on a moratorium on exploitation, they
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vestigators concluded that more information was needed on the appropri-
ate technology before any proposals could feasibly be made.1 6 7
At the Fourth Session of UNCLOS III the First Committee produced
a Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT)16 8 based on all informal group
discussions.16 9 An annex on prospecting'" resolved the controversy as to
the Authority's scope of power' by vesting the right to seabed resources
in "mankind as a whole".17 2 The International Seabed Authority would
select mining applicants and exercise broad administrative powers.1 7 3 The
Enterprise, the Authority's business arm, would carry on the Authority's
activities on the seabed under its direction and in pursuance of its
goals.174 Article 3 stated that "the Area and its resources are the common
heritage of mankind.""' 5
By the end of the Fourth Session it was clear that only three major
issues required further attention: the structure and function of the Au-
thority, the conditions that would govern exploitation of seabed re-
sources, and ways to avert deleterious effects on developing States' econo-
mies. 27 The Fifth Session inherited these issues and funnelled them to
the First Committee. 7 The Committee's discussions of the ill-received
SNT and RSNT identified the pivotal issue: should the regime (1) guar-
antee States Parties permanent access to the Area, (2) allow the Author-
ity to permit access subject to certain conditions, or (3) phase out States'
activities in favor of those of the Authority?17 8 In a major concession, the
United States stated it would accept an arrangement whereby the Enter-
adopted the United States delegate's suggestion that they exercise "restraint while seeking
timely and agreed solutions." Burton, supra note 5, at 448, citing T. Sellin, Report of the
United States Delegation to the Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (12 Dec.
1975).
167 Dugger, supra note 5, at 316.
' U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. 1 (1976); reprinted in 6 NEW DImCTIONS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA 582 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RSNT].
169 Id. at Articles 3 and 4.
170 Id. at Annex I, p. 596.
17 Id. at Article 9, p. 583.
1 Id. at Annex I, Article 1, p. 596.
'7 Id. at Annex I, Articles 7(e) and 8, p. 596.
14 Id. at Annex I, Article 12. Under this Article the Authority could determine dura-
tion of seabed activities, categories of minerals which could be mined, production matters,
and distribution of benefits.
175 Id. at Article 3, p. 586. Other articles provide that the Area is not subject to claims
of sovereignty, id. at Article 4, p. 586, and may be used only for peaceful purposes, id. at
Article 8, p. 586.
'16 United Nations, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Fifth Session, New York,
Note by the President of the Conference (Aug. 2, 1976); reprinted in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA 681-682 (1977).
177 Id. at 675-676.
178 Id. at 685.
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prise would commence mining operations concurrently with those of
States and private parties, but only on the condition that the States
would operate on equal footing with the Enterprise. 1' e Clearly, the previ-
ously irreconcilable points of view were beginning to converge.180 The fur-
ther success of the Conference mandated choice of one of these
alternatives.
Outer space negotiations in 1976 were also hampered by a deadlock
on the issue of resource exploitation."8 ' Italy and several other States sub-
mitted proposals for lunar resource regimes in which the legal machinery
would be set up prior to exploitation."8 2 Conversely, the Soviet Union
joined other States to urge that no regime be formulated until exploita-
tion was feasible, with membership being strictly limited.' 3 The resulting
impasse halted all negotiations for the next two years.18 4
Concern for the Antarctic environment prompted the Consultative
Parties to agree at their Ninth Meeting on an immediate moratorium on
all resource recovery.8 5 They recommended a "future regime" to protect
the ecosystem,"8 " cautioning that any actions taken regarding mineral re-
sources "should not prejudice the interests of all mankind in Antarc-
tica."187 Elements of the common heritage doctrine had clearly begun to
influence Antarctic policymaking.
In the spring and summer of 1977 the UNCLOS delegation drafted
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT)."'8 Though it provided
a solid basis for discussion, the ICNT failed to address crucial questions
of the Authority's competency, locus of power, and resource management
178 Id. at 686.
Igo The importance of the United States' concession cannot be overemphasized. Earlier,
the industrial States had refused to accept any sort of Authority. Now, all factions "ac-
cept(ed) roles by both the Enterprise and private companies. The disagreement (lay) in
their respective roles and it is here that the impasse focuses." Id. at 688.
181 Christol, supra note 87, at 145.
182 U.N. Doc. PUOS/C.2(XV)WG.I/Working Paper 2; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/171, Annex
I, p. 2 (May 1976). The other States were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, Nige-
ria, Romania, Sierra Leone, and Venezuela; see Christol, supra note 87, at 145.
,53 Christol, supra note 87, at 144, citing U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.246 (Aug. 3,
1976).
'4 Christol, supra note 87, at 146.
" Report of the Ninth Consultative Meeting, Sept. 16-Oct. 7, 1977, Recommendation
IX-1: Antarctic Mineral Resources; reprinted in 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 523 (1978). Other
concerns included the inevitable international discord and possible interference with scien-
tific investigations.
186 Id. It should be noted that at this time the developed countries also favored a future
regime, in some form, for exploitation of lunar resources. See Christol, supra note 87, at 144.
187 Recommendation IX-1, supra note 185, at Section 4(iv).
18s U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (July 15, 1977); reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALs 1108 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT].
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functions.189 Opinion on the first two questions was still sharply split be-
tween the developed countries and the Group of 77, which advocated a
strong Authority.'90 There was some consensus on management, but the
essentially political impasse remained.' A text on exploration and ex-
ploitation drafted at the Seventh Session resolved some of these
problems.1 9' Amended Article 151 ensured participation of States in all
seabed activities while leaving organization and control largely to the Au-
thority.19 3 This provision struck the needed balance between guaranteed
access and strong international control, and outlined a detailed procedure
for the transfer of technology to the developing countries.9
Unfortunately, the compromise on State access to the seabed gave
rise to another obstacle: the developed countries feared the overwhelming
voting power of the Group of 77 in the Assembly, the Authority's gov-
erning body.9 5 Hence, at the Resumed Seventh Session, the industrial
States demanded detailed provisions, hoping to solidify as many issues as
possible to avoid being outvoted later.9 6 The Group of 77 preferred vague
principles whose later interpretation would require votes in which they
were certain to prevail. 97
In April 1978, Austria submitted a working paper to COPUOS which
ended a two-year standstill in outer space negotiations. Article 11 of the
draft Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies formulated the common heritage principle in a
way acceptable to all Parties: "For the purposes of this Agreement, the
moon and its natural resources shall be considered the common heritage
of mankind, which finds its expression in the relevant portions of this
Agreement and in particular in paragraph 5 of this Article."' 98 Pursuant
to paragraph 5, the Parties would undertake to formulate a regime gov-
erning exploitation at such time as it became feasible. 99 Strict limitation
119 Byrum, An International Seabed Authority: The Impossible Dream?, 10 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 629-631 (1978).
190 Id. at 638-640, figs. 4 and 5.
191 Id. at 656, 657. The various blocs were more concerned with advancing their political
ideologies than with formulating a workable plan on which the Authority could function.
192 U.N. Doc.NG.1/10/Rev.1, Annex A, Article 151, 10 UNCLOS Off. Rcrds. 25 (1978).
193 Explanatory Memorandum by the Chairman Concerning Doc. NG 1/10/Rev. 1, 10
UNCLOS Off. Rcrds. 19 (1978).
194 Id. at 292.
195 Explanatory Memorandum by the Chairman, supra note 193, at 297.
199 Reports of the Committee and Negotiating Groups on Negotiations at the Resumed
Seventh Session, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.62/RCNG/1, 10 UNCLOS Off. Rcrds. 13 (1978).
197 Id.
1 U.N. Doc.A/AC.105/218, Annex I, p. 210 (1978); reprinted in Current Documents, 9
J. SPACE L. 148 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Austrian Draft].
199 Austrian Draft, supra note 198, at Article 1, pars. 1 and 5. The purposes of this
regime, embodied in paragraph 7, included safe development and rational management of
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of the principle to the subject matter of the Moon Treaty precluded its
application as law in deep seabed negotiations, where it was already the
focus of numerous political problems. 00 Furthermore, delaying common
heritage application spared the Parties the ordeal of formulating the nec-
essary regime, a task in which UNCLOS was already mired.2 1 Even the
U.S.S.R., a major opponent of the common heritage principle, 20 2 accepted
the Austrian draft. The U.S. warned, however, that it would support an
international program only to the extent that it advanced American inter-
ests and did not limit the "fundamental rights" of self-defense and infor-
mation retrieval. 20 3 Despite this and other resistance, the Draft was a ma-
jor step in implementation of the common heritage principle.
4. 1979: The Principle Becomes Law
The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) was revised at the
Eighth Session of UNCLOS 111204 to assure: 1) cooperation between the
Authority and States Parties in transfer of technology to the Enterprise
and to the developing countries, 2 5 2) effective participation by the devel-
oping countries, 2 6 3) safe development and rational management poli-
cies, 20 7 and 4) technological assistance from the industrial States. 20 s De-
spite these substantial achievements, a major conflict arose when the
Group of 77 attempted to declare seabed mining legislation on the na-
tional level illegal. 20 9 The U.S. maintained that since no principle of inter-
resources, expansion of exploitation opportunities, and equitable sharing in the benefits ac-
cruing from use of the resources.
200 See supra note 151 and following textual discussion.
201 Id.
202 The U.S.S.R. vehemently opposed the principle, calling it vague and unnecessary.
See Bond, supra note 114, at 158. That State has, however, been virtually alone in its criti-
cism of the principle as part of the Moon Treaty. Id. Ironically, the U.S.S.R. had voiced no
objection to inclusion of "province of mankind" in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. See Chris-
tol, supra note 47, at 458.
203 White House Press Release, June 30, 1978-U.S. Presidential Decision Memoran-
dum 37. (Q WEEKLY Comp. Pres. Doc. (_) (June 30, 1978).
20 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1 (April 28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT Re-
vision 1].
20I Id. at Article 144. See United Nations, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Eighth Session, 19 March-27 April 1979, A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1, 28 April 1979, Explana-
tory Memorandum by the President of the Conference; reprinted in 10 NEW DIRECTIONS IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA 134 (1980).
206 ICNT Revision 1, supra note 204, at Article 148.
2'0 Id. at Article 150.
108 Id. at Article 274.
209 Statement by the Chairman of the Group of 77, 11 UNCLOS Official Records, U.N.
Sales No. E.80.V.6. (1980). Chairman Carias (Honduras) stated that, insofar as Resolution
2749 "was widely regarded as the expression of existing international law" regarding seabed
mining, national legislation authorizing seabed mining was illegal and would not create
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national law barred enactment of domestic laws, such laws were valid,
especially in view of the long lead times expected.21 0
In 1979 COPUOS produced a draft agreement on the moon and other
celestial bodies211 based on the Austrian draft of 1978.212 Article 11,
slightly modified, declared the natural resources of the moon and other
celestial bodies the "common heritage of mankind, which finds its expres-
sion in the provisions of this Agreement and in particular in paragraph 5
of this Article."21 That paragraph, as in the Austrian draft, provided for
establishment of a resource regime once exploitation became possible.214
Paragraph 7 significantly provided that benefits would be shared by
States Parties with consideration not only for the developing countries'
need, but also for "the efforts of those countries which have contributed
either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon."21 States
were thus given incentive to engage in resource development. 2 6 This
draft, with only minor revisions, became the Moon Treaty. It was adopted
by the General Assembly in December 1979217 only because the U.S.S.R.
accepted the common heritage principle in its confined form,218 the re-
gime issue was postponed,2' 9 and the prohibition against property rights
applied only to the celestial bodies and not to substances extracted from
them.22
0
The Moon Treaty presented a new situation in international law: a
principle not yet established as law in the forum of its origin (the Law of
the Sea negotiations) had attained legal status by adoption in another
treaty.221 Furthermore, the common heritage principle was incorporated
rights recognized by the international community. See Oxman, The Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 8
(1980).
210 11 UNCLOS Official Records 4, U.N. Sales No. E.80.V.6 (1980).
21 Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20), U.N. Doc. A/23/
20 (1979); reprinted in 7 J. SPAcE L. 165 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft Moon Treaty].
212 Austrian Draft, supra note 198.
213 Draft Moon Treaty, supra note 211, at Article 11, par. 1.
214 Id. at Article 11, par. 5.
215 Id. at Article 11, par. 7.
216 Christol, supra note 87, at 447. See infra note 244.
217 G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.46) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Moon Treaty].
218 Lay, Space Law: A New Proposal, 8 J. SPAcE L. 41, 43 (1980).
210 Christol states: "(I)f there had not been a provision for the future regime and for the
identification of the required machinery, the identification of the regime's purposes (as out-
lined in Article 11, par. 7) would have been unsatisfactory." Christol, supra note 87, at 148.
220 See Christol, supra note 47, at 470-471.
221 Lay, supra note 218, at 43. See Statement by Ambassador Richard W. Petree in the
U.N. General Assembly Special Political Committee on the Report of the U.N. Outer Space
Committee and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Nov. 1, 1979; reprinted in 9 J. SPACE L. 162 (1981).
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without prejudice to its application in any other agreement. It is ironic
that one of the States that contributed heavily to the development of this
unusual treaty, the United States, has consistently refused to sign it.
222
As the decade closed, the Antarctic resources issue was caught in
"politics of uncertainty". 223 Without hard evidence of significant mineral
deposits, and without the needed technology, the question of common
heritage status for the resources remained moot. Lurking in the back-
ground, however, was the certainty that if vast resources were shown to
exist in Antarctica, States not parties to the Antarctic Treaty would urge
application of the doctrine.22' The next decade thus saw the common her-
itage principle incorporated into outer space law and firmly but uncom-
fortably entrenched in the evolving law of the sea. Many of its major un-
derpinnings were also evident in the international law of Antarctica.
E. 1980 - Present: The United States Backs Away
By the end of 1979 it was clear that exploitation of the moon and the
seabed would be governed by international regimes. In light of this cer-
tainty, the United States Government began to take stock of its policies
on resource acquisition. In April 1980 the Section of International Law of
the American Bar Association recommended that the U.S. sign the Moon
Treaty with the clear understanding that225 the common heritage princi-
ple was to be strictly limited to application in the Moon Treaty.226 The
ABA Section on Natural Resources was even more cautious. It felt ac-
ceptance of the common heritage doctrine in the Moon Treaty would hurt
Antarctic and deep seabed negotiations, and might constrain the U.S. to
accept resource regimes not necessarily in its interest.2 7 A recommenda-
tion issued jointly by both Sections in May 1981228 reflected these con-
cerns and emphasized the future applicability of the doctrine and its ap-
plication only to resources in place.229 Though the Treaty included no
moratorium provision, the Recommendation stated that none was "in-
222 TREATIES IN FORCE, DEPT. ST. Pun. 9136 (1980).
223 G. Pontecorvo, Remarks, Development of Antarctica, 73 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PROC.
266-267 (1969).
224 Id. at 266.
22' American Bar Assoc. Report to the House of Delegates Section of International Law,
Recommendation (April 18, 1980), reprinted in Current Documents, 8 J. SPACE L. 76 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ABA Recommendation].
226 Id. at par. (c).
217 Christol, The American Bar Association and the 1979 Moon Treaty: The Search for
a Position, 9 J. SPACE L. 77, 82-83 (1981).
128 American Bar Association Report to the House of Delegates (May 1981); reprinted
in 9 J. SPACE L. 90 (1981)[hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
21" Id. at par. (c), (d). Cf. ABA Recommendation, supra note 225 (natural resources "in
place").
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tended or required."'2 30 Finally, the paper warned that good faith bargain-
ing requirements did not obligate the U.S. to accept any particular
regime.'31
Congress took a stance on the deep seabed resource issue on June 28,
1980 by enacting the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act23 2 as an
interim measure to facilitate mining operations pending conclusion of the
Law of the Sea Treaty.233 The Act provided for licensing and certification
of parties wishing to mine, and required that all international agreements
guarantee U.S. citizens access to the seabed.23 4 The Act was purportedly
based on the premise that immediate exploitation would further the pur-
poses of the evolving treaty, yet it asserted that seabed mining was a free-
dom of the high seas. 235 At the Ninth Session of UNCLOS InI, the Group
of 77 expressed outrage at this Act.2 6 The U.S. prevented a heated de-
bate only by assuring that mining would not commence before 1988.21
The Ninth Session's major achievement was the Draft Convention on
the Law of the Sea, which declared that the seabed and its resources were
the common heritage of mankind.23 8 The Authority would consist of a
supreme Assembly of all Authority members, 23 9 a subordinate Council
charged with finances, 240 and an Enterprise which would mine the seabed
under the Council's direction. 241 The debate on State access was resolved
by a provision setting up a "parallel system" wherein States and private
entities would have opportunities equal to those of the Enterprise.242
The work left for the Tenth Session included setting up a Prepara-
230 ABA Report, supra note 228, at par. (e).
231 Id. at par. (f).
22 Act of June 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980); reprinted in 19 IN'VL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1003 (1980).
233 Id. at Sec. 2, par. 16.
234 Id. at Title I, and Title II Sec. 201.
235 Id. at Sec. 2, par. 5 and 12.
236 Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth
Session (1980), 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 211, 212 (1980).
237 Oxman, supra note 236.
238 14 UNCLOS Official Records, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 3 (27 Aug. 1980);
reprinted in 11 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea, with page cite to 11 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA]. The Draft was based on a revision of the ICNT produced at earlier meetings of the
Ninth Session; ICNTIRev.2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10Rev.2 (1980). See id. at Article
136 at 70.
239 Id. at Articles 159-160, at 82-84.
240 Id. at Articles 161-162, at 85-89.
241 Id. at Annex IV, "Statute of the Enterprise," Article 1, par. 1, at 172.
243 See Oxman, supra note 236, at 213-214. Each State or private applicant would pro-
pose two sites, the revenues from one of which would be reserved for the developing coun-
tries. Revenues from the "non-reserved" site would be distributed in part to the mining
State.
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tory Commission to establish the Authority and write its rules and regula-
tions.1 3 The developing countries disliked the idea of interim measures,
but the developed countries felt the Commission was needed for predict-
ability. 44 The U.S. not only reserved its position on this issue, but also
refused to discuss any substantive issues during the entire Session.2 4'5 The
reason for this move became clear in April 1981 when the State Depart-
ment announced its intention to conduct an exhaustive policy review in
light of key national interests such as security. 48 The study would target
"burdensome" restraints on seabed mining, mandatory funding of the
Enterprise, and lack of incentive for investors. 2 47 The review was com-
pleted in January 1982 with the decision to return to the negotiations,
but with a tougher stance on the seabed mining issue.
24 8
As of this writing, the United States has not signed the Moon Treaty.
III. STATUS OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND PRINCIPLE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
This section considers the extent to which the common heritage prin-
ciple has attained international legal significance. International law is
premised on the presumption that binding rules are expressions of the
free will of States. The corollary rule is that restrictions on their indepen-
dence cannot be presumed binding on them.24 9 Indeed, the critical in-
quiry in a situation where no specific rule has been articulated is how a
State defined its obligation to act under the circumstances. A rule set
forth in a treaty may, for example, become binding on non-parties by op-
243 Id. at 211-212.
214 81 DEPT. STATE BuLL. 49-50 (1981).
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 The Group of 77 expects the current session to see completion of the Convention.
Alvaro de Soto, new Chairman of the Group, stated: "If it is not possible to reach agreement
with all states, the Group of 77 wishes to proceed to the adoption of a convention." He made
this statement in response to a 43-page proposal released by the United States, containing
demands for concessions which De Soto hopes will be withdrawn.
In the meantime, the U.S. has concluded a treaty with France, Britain and West Ger-
many whereby sites selected by private companies of all four States will be recognized.
Tommy Koh, President of the Conference, has persuaded France to exercise restraint, but
feels the treaty will fail because investors will balk in the face of the more heavily supported
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The greatest obstacle to the success of the Convention is the meaninglessness of the
common heritage provisions without the cooperation of the United States. The U.S. wishes
to abolish the limits the Convention seeks to set on the amount of minerals that could be
extracted from the seabed, an attitude which antagonizes the Group of 77. N.Y. Times,
March 9, 1982, at 6, coL. 1.
249 Case of the S.S. "Lotus", 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10.
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eration of international custom.2"
At present the common heritage principle is incorporated in only one
treaty in force (the Moon Treaty) and in one U.N. General Assembly Res-
olution. Only the former is binding in international law. Furthermore, the
Moon Treaty strictly limits the principle to the scope and purposes of
that Treaty, and contemplates its application only when exploitation of
extraterrestrial resources is about to become feasible. It cannot fairly be
argued that the common heritage principle has ripened into law by means
of the traditional processes of custom and assent of civilized nations, and
its history is so plagued with disagreement that generalized assent cannot
be inferred.2
51
The sheer volume of resolutions, draft and effective agreements, and
other materials indicates nevertheless that the common heritage of man-
kind is entrenched in contemporary international affairs, and that at least
some aspects of the doctrine have attained legal status.2 2 Furthermore,
there is a clear and pressing need for global resource management, one of
the elements of common heritage, especially since technology has outdis-
tanced international law in these areas.25" The common heritage principle
260 United Kingdom v. Norway, 1951 I.C.J. 116.
151 See Note, Soviet Legal Apporach to Space Law Issues at the United Nations, 3
LOYOLA INT'L & Comp. L. ANN. 99, 101 (1980). The United States considers international
custom "potentially the most important source of law with regard to space activities." Sovi-
ets, however, maintain that treaties are the primary source of space law. The U.S.S.R. has,
in fact, attacked international custom as a tool of the "capitalist" nations. INTERNATONAL
SPACE LAW 75-76 (A. Piradov ed. 1976).
252 E.g., peaceful use, disarmament, cooperation, common usage and international
management.
22 Christol, supra note 47, at 448-449: "It is abundantly evident that in today's world
the most powerful cannot proceed as they may wish without consulting the outlooks of other
States. A too heavy reliance on certain national-interest policies may be counterproductive
and regrettably myopic in the presence of the need for all States to share in the effective
management of world affairs. This includes the formation of world regimes ... designed to
serve the needs, wants, interests, and values of mankind at large." See also Hambro, supra
note 28, at 221. The need for international resource management is made even clearer by
the recent crisis in the Falkland Islands, the "gateway to Antarctica." This battle between
Britain and Argentina is only the most recent in a long series of power plays involving Ar-
gentina, Chile, and Britain; see, e.g., Antarctica Cases, supra note 27 and accompanying
text. Clearly the violence will escalate and spread south to the Antarctic if the sovereignty
disputes are left unresolved. See N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1982, §2, at 27. Indeed, only Antarc-
tica's current lack of strategic value saves it from appropriation by some states State as a
military base. Remarks by Jonathan I. Charney, Development of Antarctica, 73 Am. Soc.
INT'L L. PRoc. 268 (1979).
In 1979 Ambassador Richard Petree stated, regarding the Draft Moon Treaty. "(W)e
cannot fail to note the concerns expressed by members of the Outer Space Commitee lest
outer space become yet another area where man makes war ... While the (U.N. Charter)
predates man's entry into space, its principles and provisions, including those relating to the
permissible and impermissible uses of force, are as valid for outer space as they are for our
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could be useful as a basis for global sharing of scarce resources. This sec-
tion therefore assesses the principle's scope in the international law of
remote areas containing valuable natural resources.
Arvid Pardo, who first announced the principle, identifies its three
central concepts: 1) absence of private property rights, i.e. the right to use
resources but not to own them; 2) international management of all uses of
the common heritage; and 3) sharing of benefits derived from such use.2"4
Management may include environmental protection, preservation of re-
sources for future generations, and equitable sharing of benefits among all
states (Pardo's third element). The concept of management is to be im-
plemented through an international regime allowing both the exploring
States and "other States" to reap the benefits. 55 At present the treaties
and subsequent actions constituting the law of outer space, the deep sea-
bed, and Antarctica embody the ideas of absence of sovereignty, interna-
tional sharing of various benefits, and international regimes for manage-
ment of natural resources. It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the common heritage principle applies to all three areas.
A. Absence of Sovereignty
The right of mankind regarding areas and resources with common
heritage of mankind status is one of title. Once ownership has vested in
"mankind", no State can assert sovereignty in derogation of that right.25 6
Under the Law of the Sea Treaty, the Authority will be charged with
protecting the rights and interests of mankind. Such protection is argua-
bly impossible if all States are not parties to the treaties implementing
the principle. 57 Moreover, the Moon Treaty extended the common heri-
tage provision to persons as well as States, because the industrial States
wished to allow private entities to mine the moon. Thus, while both
States and nongovernmental entities may acquire proprietary rights in lu-
seas, land or air. We welcome the international community's reaffirmation in the Moon
Treaty of this essential point." Statement by Ambassador Richard Petree in the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Special Political Committee on the Report of the U.N. Outer Space Commit-
tee and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Nov. 1, 1979; reprinted in 9 J. SPACE L. 162 (1972).
See also Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof,
23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7737, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (1972).
254 E. BORGHESE, "Preface to the Emerging Ocean Regime," in PACEM IN MARIBUS 161-
162 (1971).
2" Christol, supra note 227, at 78.
258 N. REMBE, supra note 5, at 54. For an excellent discussion of the semantic and con-
ceptual problems surrounding "mankind", see Gorove, supra note 76, at 393-394.
25, Gorove, supra note 76, at 395.
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
nar resources no longer in place,2"8 the prohibition against sovereignty
over resources not yet extracted applies equally to States and individual
persons.2 59
The Third World maintains that Antarctica is not amenable to sover-
eignty, asserting that the existing claims have no place in a world commu-
nity recognizing the need for international, rather than unilateral, ap-
proaches to resource problems.260 While the Antarctic Treaty has
preserved the claims for reconsideration in 1989, it is likely that their
validity will be questioned seriously, particularly by the United States,
which recognizes no such claims. The Consultative Parties themselves
have implied, in their Recommendations on Antarctic Mineral Resources,
that the claims are subordinate at least in part to the rights of man-
kind.28 1 The idea of sovereignty in Antarctica is clearly being replaced by
notions more in keeping with the doctrine of common heritage.
B. International Management
It is generally recognized that an international regime is needed to
put the common heritage principle into effect. Such regimes have been
under discussion since 1968.262 The Antarctic Convention on Mineral Re-
sources recites the need for "suitable machinery". 263 The Moon Treaty
provides for a future resource regime. The UNCLOS III delegation has
been working on a seabed mining regime for seven years, impeded at
times by the complex social and political forces at play in negotiations of
this type.2 The common heritage principle has as its ultimate purpose
the effectuation of such regimes, which are meant to redistribute the
world's wealth more equitably.
265
258 See Christol, supra note 47, at 429.
259 Moon Treaty, supra note 217, at Article 11, par. 3: "Neither the surface nor the
subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or the natural resources in place, shall become
the property of any State ... or of any natural person (emphasis added)."
210 Pinto, The International Community and Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 475, 477
(1978): "There is a growing body of opinion holding that claims of sovereignty based on such
origins have no place in the world today. The contemporary world community... views its
problems at the global level and strives to arrive at rational solutions."
2"I Final Report of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Recommenda-
tion XI-1 (Antarctic Mineral Resources), Doc. ANT/XI/34/Rev.4 (1981). Paragraph 5(d)
states that "the Consultative Parties, in dealing with the question of mineral resources in
Antarctica, should not prejudice the interests of all mankind in Antarctica."
"2' See Christol, supra note 87, at 140-141.
2 5 Supra note 261.
2 See Christol, supra note 87, for an excellent discussion of the "social complex
forces" impacting on groups of States attempting to form international regimes "uniting the
desires and expectations of all contingents."
2 5 Christol states: "In its ultimate sense the (common heritage) principle provides gui-
dance in effecting an orderly and equitable distribution of resources so that a measure of
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Actual application of the common heritage principle and its associ-
ated regime seems to depend on feasibility of exploitation. The Moon
Treaty delays application until such time as exploitation is about to be-
come feasible. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the other
hand, states that the Area and its resources "are the common heritage of
mankind;" this is not surprising, as the technology needed to mine the
seabed is presently available.
The current level of activity in Antarctica has likewise pointed out
the need for orderly regulation of resource recovery in Antarctica. The
Consultative Parties deemed the formulation of a resource regime an ur-
gent matter at their Eleventh Meeting,266 after extensive study of envi-
ronmental impacts of resource exploitation on the delicate Antarctic envi-
ronment. The international management element of the common heritage
principle is as evident in Antarctic policy as it is in negotiations on the
use of lunar and seabed resources.
C. Sharing of Benefits
The treaties and conventions relating to the moon, the seabed, and
Antarctica all contain provisions for sharing of the benefits derived from
each area. The Law of the Sea Treaty will contain provisions for deep
seabed mining and distribution of the proceeds. The Moon Treaty man-
dates a scheme for the mining of lunar resources when the necessary tech-
nology exists. The current body of law on Antarctica includes provision
for mutual cooperation and sharing of information, and a recent recom-
mendation calls for a resource regime which takes the interests of all
States into account.26 7 Though the Consultative Parties are to have "spe-
cial responsibility" for managing the regime,26 8 "mankind" undeniably
has a stake in the benefits accruing from the natural resources of
Antarctica.
While the common heritage principle is explicitly incorporated in the
international law of sea and space, and arguably extends to Antarctica, its
effectiveness as a tool for global resource management has been ques-
tioned on numerous grounds. The next section discusses the problems
presented by the principle in its application to the three areas, particu-
larly Antarctica.
IV. CURRENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
The common heritage principle, of which resource management is an
global fairness can be realized." Christol, supra note 47, at 454.
2" Supra note 261, at par. 2.
267 Id. at par. 6.
2" Id. at pars. 5(a), 6 and 7(V).
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integral part, appears on its face to be a useful legal device for develop-
ment through global resource management. Carl Christol suggests that
the common heritage of mankind "will become a firmly established prin-
ciple of the international law of the sea."26 9 The principle will also en-
courage the cooperation necessary to form space-based communications
systems which will be instrumental in unifying the world community. 27 0
Moreover, as a guide for distribution of various types of tangible and in-
tangible wealth, the principle is well-suited to the needs of capitalist sys-
tems for access and orderly exploitation, and of the developing countries
for fair disbursement of benefits.271 Because Antarctica is a potential
source of vast mineral wealth, the common heritage principle could be
used to effectively guide its exploitation and development.27 2 Despite its
promise, however, many obstacles must be surmounted before the princi-
ple is accepted as an international framework for resource management.
A. Problems to Be Surmounted
Though it purports to encourage rational exploitation, the common
heritage doctrine severely restricts mineral-gathering activity. Some in-
dustrial States have argued that such exploitation will not occur unless
there is incentive to mine in the face of tight international regulation and
forced sharing of benefits, which they fear will render mining unprofita-
ble. 73 It is for this reason that the United States has displayed a "defini-
tional fetish" at both UNCLOS and COPUOS.2 74 In addition, the United
States fears that a moratorium is implied in the Moon Treaty by virtue of
the Moratorium Resolution adopted at UNCLOS 111.275 While the lan-
guage of the Moon Treaty removes extracted resources from the prohibi-
29 Christol, supra note 47, at 450-451.
170 Lay, supra note 218, at 41. The Secretary of Italy at the U.N. says of the current
trends in outer space: "(H)umanity seems to aim at a form of colonialization of the space
closest to our planet, in order to deepen its investigation of the earth, to increase the contri-
bution of space research to the economy, . . . to safeguard the balance of nature, and to
amplify-through an ever-fuller flow of communications--experiences which are already
common to a very large number of people, enabling them to feel more closely linked to a
unique destiny in the 'global village' Earth."
17' Christol, supra note 47, at 475.
"' Pinto, supra note 10, at 478.
2'7 Christol, supra note 47, at 475.
174 See Christol, supra note 87, at 479; see also Rosenfield, The Moon Treaty: The
United States Should Not Become a Party, 74 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 162, 163-164 (1980).
'75 Id. at 162. The U.S. fears that the Group of 77, which believes the Moratorium
Resolution placed legal obligations on States not to mine the seabed, will seek to extend this
policy to outer space. While there is no basis in the Moon Treaty for such a concern, a
policy statement "by the largest bloc of countries in the world" presents what some observ-
ers see as a clear threat.
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tion against ownership, the U.S. is still reluctant to sign the Treaty.2 76
Despite this fear, many U.S. experts feel that the strength of the U.S.'s
bargaining position and its technical expertise in outer space will ensure
protection of private investors' interests, thus ensuring incentive.277
The most intractable problems concern the common heritage princi-
ple's application to Antarctica. Efforts to extend the principle to Antarc-
tica may be opposed by States which view internationalization as a threat
to their "sovereignty". Antarctica is the source of tense political conflicts
among claimants which have the power to block a resolution internation-
alizing Antarctica even partially. s Further, if Antarctica's resources turn
out to be economically attractive, the developing countries will express
interest in a share of the proceeds. 279 They are in fact guaranteed such
benefits under the Antarctic Mineral Resources Recommendation. In any
case, the world's desire to exploit Antarctic minerals at some future time
will clash with the need to maintain the hard-won spirit of cooperation
and trust that made the Antarctic Treaty possible.280
B. Solutions
The U.S.'s concern about implied moratoriums in the Moon Treaty
reflects a general fear of international arrangements in which the U.S. can
be overwhelmed by the voting power of large blocs like the Group of 77.
Such a fear caused the U.S. to withdraw from the Law of the Sea negotia-
tions in 1981.281 While some sort of international lunar resource authority
is inevitable,2 2 the "ganging up" effect could be lessened by joint ven-
276 Christol, supra note 47, at 476-477.
277 See, e.g., Remarks by Delbert D. Smith, The Moon Treaty: Should The United
States Become A Party?, 74 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 167, 169-170 (1980): "The basic U.S.
position (is) that the Moon Treaty constitutes a framework and incentive for the exploita-
tion of the moon, not an impediment. (Outer space negotiations were) totally different from
those characteristic of the Law of the Sea process, if for no other reason than ... that
access to the moon is limited to a very few nations while access to the sea ... is available to
almost all nations. Given the history of policy support by the U.S. Government for the pri-
vate sector's involvement in the commercial exploitation of outer space and given the bar-
gaining position of the (U.S.) as a space power, it seems... the perceived threat to private
sector interests is overrated and constitutes only a minimal threat."
178 See Oxman, The Antarctic Regime: An Introduction, 33 U. MIAM= L. REv. 285, 289
(1978).
279 Charney, Remarks, Development of Antarctica, 73 AM. Soc. INT'L. L. PRoc. 269
(1979).
280 Hambro, supra note 28, at 224.
:81 See supra note 244.
282 Article 11, par. 3 of the Moon Treaty refers only to "international intergovernmental
organizations", in addition to States Parties, as those who cannot assert sovereignty over the
surface and subsurface; therefore "it should not be inferred that the use of a suitable inter-
national organization... was to be excluded." Christol, supra note 87, at 144.
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tures involving groups of countries. 283
With regard to Antarctica, it is probable that its resources will attain
common heritage status at the time the sovereignty claims are reviewed.
The majority of countries reject these claims and advocate international
mechanisms for resource exploitation in remote regions. It is also evident
that an interim solution is needed, as human activity in Antarctica must
be controlled to prevent damage to the environment.
Any interim proposals must take into consideration the needs of the
claimant and non-claimant States parties to the Antarctic Treaty, as well
as non-parties. 284 While the interests of mankind are given priority under
the Antarctic Mineral Resources Recommendation, the Treaty has pro-
tected the sovereignty claims pending review. The critical issue will be
the balancing of these interests.
One possible approach is negotiation of a new treaty within the UN-
CLOS forum. Unfortunately, this process would take too long to be worth
the trouble.28 5 The International Court of Justice could make a ruling on
sovereignty, but not all concerned States would follow it.2 s6 Under a joint
sovereignty or "condominium" approach, 87 the Consultative Parties
would share joint sovereignty while recognizing the interests of other
States. This system, though practical, would require the claimants to re-
linquish their claims, and would be perceived by the Group of 77 as yet
another form of sovereignty claim.288
Several variations on the joint sovereignty approach have been pro-
posed. Under "Joint Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction" (JARJ),28 9 shelf ar-
eas found to contain substantial mineral deposits would be partitioned
and opened for bidding, with the Consultative parties collecting rent. Any
State could become a Consultative Party by simple accession. 2 0 Claim-
ants could maintain their claims under this plan, while non-claimants and
283 Sadin, supra note 5, at 155: "It is quite probable that, because of the tremendous
amount of research effort needed, the learning process while conducted by individual na-
tions at first, would later be pursued by groups of nations."
284 Alexander, A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic Resource Problem, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 371, 404 (1978). The claimants, whose claims are generally unrecognized, may
feel pressured to reduce their claims to secure proprietary rights. Non-claimant States,
which recognize no claims to Antarctica, will favor freedom of access in view of rising oil
prices. States not parties to the Antarctic Treaty will attack any arrangement benefitting
only the Consultative Parties, but are likely to favor an international solution providing for
sharing of benefits from resource exploitation.
285 Id. at 409-410.
28 Id. at 413.
287 Auburn suggests that a condominium already exists on the Ross Dependency be-
tween the United States and New Zealand. F. AuBuRN, THE Ross DEPENDENCY 82 (1972).
Alexander, supra note 284, at 414-416.
288 Id. at 417.
290 Id. at 417-421.
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non-Parties could benefit from the rent (the latter by acceding to the
Treaty).291
Burton suggests a system based on the idea of an "Antarctic Commu-
nity" emphasizing the common interests underlying the diverse claims.
2 2
Interested Parties would bargain for benefits including mining opportuni-
ties and profit-sharing. While this plan benefits Parties, it rejects any sug-
gestion of benefit-sharing with non-Parties293 save voluntary contribu-
tions to world development organizations.2' This plan is not likely to
please the developing countries who are not Parties.
Under a "limited multilateral" approach,'9 a limited group of inter-
ested States would draft a convention allowing collective exploitation by
the Parties only; or alternatively, an international organization would per-
mit Parties to police activities of their nationals in Antarctica. In either
case, non-parties would play little or no role. 96 Such a plan is even more
certain than the Antarctic Community approach to "stimulate the anxie-
ties" of the Group of 77.
In view of the importance of international development under the
New International Economic Order the "common heritage" model pro-
posed by Joyner should be given preference.29 The developing countries
as a group have become a force to be reckoned with during the past dec-
ade. Their exclusion from decisions as important as the disposition of a
continent is, in view of their growing power, impossible today.
V. CONCLUSION
The negotiating histories of the Moon, Antarctica, and Law of the
Sea Treaties reveal the principle of the "common heritage of mankind" in
three distinct phases of implementation. It is firmly entrenched in the
developing law of the sea, where it covers both the International Seabed
Area and its resources, and provides for an international regime to imple-
ment the principle. It is articulated in limited form in the Moon Treaty,
where it will apply to celestial bodies but not to resources extracted from
them, when exploitation becomes feasible. It has not yet been formally
extended to Antarctica, though certain elements-international manage-
291 Id. at 419-421.
292 Burton, supra note 5, at 472-477.
293 Id. at 508.
24 Id. at 510.
295 Charney, supra note 279, at 270.
2H Id. at 270-271.
29 For an excellent discussion of the legal justifications for a more international ap-
proach to resource management in Antarctica, see Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the
Sea: Rethinking the Current Legal Dilemmas, in COLLECTED PAPERS FROM CURRENT ISSUES
IN THE LAW OF THE SPA (C. Joyner ed. 1979).
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ment and sharing of benefits-have long been part of the relevant agree-
ments. Application of the principle to the resources of Antarctica awaits
two events: settlement of outstanding claims of sovereignty, and concrete
proof of economically significant resources. Meanwhile, an interim regime
may be necessary to ensure efficient exploitation and environmental pro-
tection. The most realistic approach would be to adopt a regime modelled
on the idea of common heritage.
Recent moon and seabed negotiations have evidenced States' willing-
ness to address the practicalities of resource recovery and management.
Unfortunately, the United States has only recently returned to UNCLOS,
and refuses to sign the Moon Treaty. The U.S.'s cooperation is essential
to the success of the common heritage principle, as few other States have
the expertise necessary to commence mining operations in any of the
three areas, and one goal of the principle is to encourage exploitation.
Thus, the key to the success of the common heritage principle's imple-
mentation is achievement of the proper balance between the needs of the
developing countries and those of the industrial nations which will carry
the initial burden of setting up operations and providing the necessary
technology. The goal of negotiations on all fronts in the next decade
should be to achieve this balance, as it will also be crucial to the resolu-
tion of the resource question in Antarctica.
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